Another E-Commerce Giant Collapses! Burdened with 100 Billion Debt, It Declares Bankruptcy

01 The Fall of a South Korean E-Commerce Giant: From Glory to Collapse

Amid an economic downturn, the e-commerce industry faces mounting hardships. Recently, the Seoul Bankruptcy Court of South Korea officially confirmed the termination of the reorganization procedure for well-known e-commerce platform WeMakePrice and declared it bankrupt. This news marks the end of WeMakePrice’s more than a year of self-rescue efforts.

From filing for reorganization to finally being declared bankrupt, this once-prominent enterprise failed to escape the quagmire of a liquidity crisis. Ultimately, it collapsed under unsustainable debt—with liabilities reaching 446.2 billion won (approximately $320 million) and assets of only 48.6 billion won—becoming another victim of the economic cold wave.

Public records show that WeMakePrice emerged in the early days of South Korea’s e-commerce sector. Alongside platforms like Coupang and Tmon, it rose rapidly through "social commerce" and "group buying" models. By aggregating a large number of buyers to secure deep discounts, this model strongly stimulated consumption and met the public’s pursuit of cost-effectiveness.

For a long period, WeMakePrice occupied a key position in South Korea’s e-commerce market with its rich SKUs, attractive pricing strategies, and frequent promotions, winning over a large number of young users. In 2019, its annual sales exceeded 465.3 billion won, making it a star enterprise in South Korea’s e-commerce industry.

Second, when "group buying" was no longer the sole model and all platforms started offering B2C self-operation, cross-border e-commerce, and lifestyle services, WeMakePrice failed to build sufficient differentiated core competitiveness, leading to an underlying crisis.

Coupled with the subsequent impact of the pandemic, intensified competition, and tightening capital markets, its revenue plummeted to less than 200 billion won in 2022. In 2023, WeMakePrice was acquired by Singaporean e-commerce group Qoo10, operating alongside another platform TMON. However, the capital chain issue was not fundamentally resolved. In July 2024, both WeMakePrice and TMON filed for reorganization due to unpaid merchant payments and consumer refunds. It was not until September 2025 that the Seoul Bankruptcy Court terminated the procedure due to the lack of a feasible reorganization plan, officially declaring bankruptcy two months later.

02 Wish: From $10 Billion Valuation to a 1% Fire Sale

While WeMakePrice’s experience is regrettable, it is undeniable that the bankruptcy and collapse of e-commerce platforms have not been uncommon in recent years. According to incomplete statistics, from 2024 to November 13, 2025, more than ten e-commerce platforms worldwide have undergone bankruptcy liquidation or forced acquisition.

In addition to WeMakePrice, Wish—also acquired by Qoo10 last year—has a similarly striking "fall from grace." Once a representative cross-border e-commerce platform on par with Amazon and eBay, it took only four years for Wish to go from a $10 billion valuation to a low-cost sale.

The story dates back to December 2020, when Wish’s parent company ContextLogic went public on Nasdaq with a valuation of $14 billion, and its market value once exceeded $17 billion. That was Wish’s peak moment—and its last.

After going public, Wish’s performance declined instead of growing. According to SEC filings, Wish’s revenue in 2021 was approximately $2.1 billion, a year-on-year decrease of 20%; in 2022, revenue further dropped to about $570 million; by the third quarter of 2023, quarterly revenue was only around $56 million, a year-on-year decrease of 57%, with a net loss of approximately $80 million. Its user base also shrank rapidly, from 90 million active users in 2021 to 11 million in 2023.

Behind the performance collapse were a worsening capital chain crisis and a merchant trust crisis.

As early as 2019, Wish sparked controversy by imposing high fines on Chinese merchants frequently on the grounds of "misleading products." Fines ranged from 60,000 to over 3 million yuan, deducted directly from merchants’ unpaid payments. According to incomplete statistics, more than 50 merchants were fined, with the highest cumulative fine exceeding $400,000.

By the worst phase of its performance in 2023-2024, Wish was exposed for delaying merchant payments for up to a year. A home goods seller in Shenzhen reported that in December 2024, their $87,000 payment was still in "processing," with a total frozen amount exceeding $420,000; an outdoor goods seller in Yiwu also faced a capital chain crunch due to approximately 1.37 million yuan in unpaid payments.

For small and medium-sized merchants relying on platform payments, delayed payments and forced deductions dealt a double blow, leading to a mass exodus of Chinese merchants. This further exacerbated the vicious cycle of shrinking product supply and declining user experience on the platform.

In an attempt to reverse the situation, Wish tried to win back users by "improving user experience, deepening relationships with merchants, and achieving operational excellence." However, merchant trust had already collapsed completely—outstanding debts remained unpaid, and new policies failed to address core payment settlement issues. These "self-rescue" measures were clearly ineffective. In the end, Wish was sold to Qoo10 for $174 million, only 1% of its peak valuation.

Both WeMakePrice’s collapse and Wish’s downfall reflect that the e-commerce industry has entered a deep phase of "stock competition." The business models that once thrived on traffic dividends, capital injection, and price wars are being ruthlessly eliminated by the times.

In the cold winter of the economic cycle, platforms that fail to innovate during critical model transitions will eventually be replaced by new players with higher efficiency, stronger trust, and a better understanding of users. Stable cash flow, sustainable user value, and systematic operational capabilities have become the key factors for enterprise survival.